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Much has been written about the ramifications of recent Supreme Court
decisions in the area of patent subject matter eligibility' on innovation in the
area of personalized medicine. 2  Yet, regulatory competitive shelters
("RCSs")3 have remained largely unexplored as a mechanism for incentivizing
innovation in that area, possibly in lieu of patents. Similarly, in a recent report
and related guidance documents, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
made clear its commitment to streamlining regulation in the area of
* Assistant Professor, Georgia State University College of Law; J.S.D. 2011, LL.M. 2004
Columbia Law School; LL.B. 2000, Undergraduate Diploma in Biology 2000 Tel Aviv
University.
I See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012);
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
2 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Haanes & Jaume M. CAnaves, Stealing Fire: A Retrospective
Survey of Biotech Patent Claims in the Wake of Mayo v. Prometheus, 30 NATURE BIOTECH.
758, 760 (2012) (concluding that "Prometheus is a game changer" as it renders invalid most
patent claims directed to diagnostic products). For the purpose of this Paper, "personalized
medicine" (a.k.a. pharmacogenomics, individualized medicine, and precision medicine) is to
be understood broadly as "the tailoring of medical treatment to the individual
characteristics, needs and preferences of a patient during all stages of care, including
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and follow-up." FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PAVING THE WAY
FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FDA's ROLE IN A NEW ERA OF MEDICAL PRODUCT
DEVELOPMENT 6 (2013) [hereinafter PAVING THE WAY].
3 Broadly defined, RCSs are competitive advantages resulting from statutory bars on
regulatory action where such action is otherwise mandated in legislation and would have
taken place but for the triggering of the bar; thus, RCSs are the result of an administrative
agency's inability to take certain regulatory action that, had such action been taken, would
have paved the way for competition in a certain product or market. See Yaniv Heled,
Introducing: Regulatory Competitive Shelters, the New Patents, 76 OHIo ST. L.J. 299
(2015). RCSs are also commonly known by other names such as "regulatory exclusivities,"
"data exclusivities," and "statutory exclusivities," among others. See id. (explaining how
these names fail to characterize RCSs with sufficient specificity and sometimes misstate
RCSs' function).
287
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
personalized medicine.4 These documents, however, also do not address the
RCSs available to personalized medicine technologies. This Article seeks to
explore the existing landscape of RCSs that are currently available to
personalized medicine technologies and highlight further ways in which RCSs
may provide incentives for innovation in such technologies.
REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTERS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE TO
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE TECHNOLOGY
Personalized medicine technology can be roughly classified into the
following technology categories:
1. Pharmaceutical products meant for use in specific patients exhibiting
particular physiological characteristics or pathologies.5
2. Medical devices meant for use in specific patients exhibiting particular
physiological characteristics or pathologies.
3. Personalized tissues, organs, and vaccines made from or impregnated
with a patient's own biological material. 6
4. Diagnostic devices, tests, and direct-to-consumer ("DTC") kits meant for
use independently, or with technologies of the abovementioned categories (1),
(2), or (3), including in vitro companion diagnostic devices.7
5. Devices and methods for analyzing large quantities of medical and
clinical information in order to determine therapeutically relevant correlations,
including via algorithms.8
4 See PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 2 (referring to the FDA's "many recent efforts
to advance regulatory standards, methods and tools in support of personalized medicine and
to further refine critical regulatory processes and policies in order to bring about
personalized medicine product development").
s Traditionally, personalized medicine has been thought of as consisting mostly of this
type of technologies. As such, some have described personalized medicine as "providing
the right treatment to the right patient, at the right dose at the right time." Id. at 6-7.
6 Examples include stem cell therapies, artificial organs (such as a 3D-printed trachea),
gene therapies performed on tissue ex-vivo, and personalized immunotherapies. See, e.g.,
Cedrik M. Britten et al., The Regulatory Landscape for Actively Personalized Cancer
Immunotherapies, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 880 (2013) (describing different courses of
treatment for cancer using immunotherapies tailored to a patient's own genetic makeup).
7 Examples include genetic assays of various kinds and genetic sequencing devices. See
John T. Aquino, FDA's Clearance of Diagnostic Devices Seen as Aiding Personalized
Medicine, HEALTH IT LAW & INDUSTRY REP., Dec. 02, 2013, at 10 (discussing the FDA's
clearance of a high-throughput genetic sequencing device and a genetic assay testing for 139
genetic variants of cystic fibrosis); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IN VITRO COMPANION
DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF 4-5 (2014) [hereinafter IN VITRO COMPANION DIAGNOSTICS GUIDANCE] (defining in
vitro companion diagnostic devices as "an in vitro diagnostic device that provides
information that is essential for the safe and effective use of a corresponding therapeutic
product").
8 Notably, some diagnostic products, especially ones meant to predict probabilities of
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6. Databases containing medical information used for or in conjunction with
technologies of the abovementioned categories (1)-(5).9
All six categories of personalized medicine technologies are potentially
subject to RCS regimes administered by the FDA as discussed below.
RCSs for New Products
Like all new pharmaceutical products, personalized medicine technologies
of categories (1) and (3) listed above may benefit from RCSs under the Orphan
Drug Act (seven-year market exclusivity), ' 0 Hatch-Waxman Act (five-year
market exclusivity and four- or five-year data exclusivity)," and the Biologics
Price Competition and Innovation Act ("BPCIA") (twelve-year market
exclusivity and four-year data exclusivity).1 2 An example is the seven-year
orphan drug exclusivity and concurrent five-year new chemical entity ("NCE")
exclusivity in the drug Kalydeco (Ivacaftor) under the Orphan Drug Act and
the Hatch-Waxman Act, respectively.13
clinical outcomes and recurrences, incorporate both a diagnostic component (e.g. a genetic
array) and a method of analyzing the data obtained from the diagnostic. See, e.g., Mark
Ratner, Kits Herald a New Wave of Genomic Diagnostics for Cancer, 30 NATURE BIOTECH.
1152, 1153 tbl.1 (2012) (listing commercially available genomic diagnostic test products
that work in conjunction with complex algorithms).
9 An example is the BRCA genetic mutations database held as a trade secret by the
company Myriad Genetics, Inc. See Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Myriad's Trade Secret Trump
Card: The Myriad Database Of Genetic Variants, PHARMAPATENTS (July 18, 2013),
http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2013/07/1 8/the-myriad-database-of-genetic-variants/
(archived at http://perma.cc/BC3V-PQB2).
'o Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee
(2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 236 (2012)) [hereinafter ODA].
" Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 21, 35, & 42 U.S.C.).
12 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 7000 et seq., 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C § 262(k)(7) (2012)).
13 See FOOD & DRUG ADM IN., Patent and Exclusivity Search Results from Query on Appl
No 203188 Product 001 in the OBRx List, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfn?ApplNo=2031 88&Pro
ductNo=001&tablel=OBRx (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) (archived at
http://perma.cc/2CCR-FFBG). Kalydero is a small-molecule drug indicated for the
treatment of a specific mutation that is responsible for cystic fibrosis-a disease caused by
hundreds of different known mutations-in about 4% of those suffering from the disease in
the United States. See PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 3. Other examples include Xalkori
(Crizotinib), Zelboraf (Vemurafenib), and Tafinlar (Dabrafenib), all of which are small-
molecule drugs, that are the subject of seven-year ODEs and concurrent five-year NCE
exclusivities. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Patent and Exclusivity Search Results from Query on
Appl No 202570 Product 001 in the OB_Rx List, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexcinew.cfin?ApplNo=202570&Pro
ductNo=001&tableI=OBRx (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (archived at
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Of particular importance in this respect is the seven-year orphan drug
exclusivity under the ODA. As indicated by the FDA, "[d]ata from the last
few years indicate that more and more drugs are being designed for small
populations, a trend that is consistent with the increasing use of stratification in
drug development."1 4 It is, thus, quite possible that a continuation of this trend
would lead to such levels of specificity in the uses for which drug products are
indicated, that a substantially larger percentage of products will be designated
as orphan drugs, which would make them subject to the ODA's seven-year
market exclusivity.
RCSs for Additional Clinical Testing Leading to New Therapeutic Uses of
Already Approved Pharmaceuticals
A Three-Year Market Exclusivity Under the Hatch-Waxman Act for
Conducting Supplemental Clinical Investigations Leading to
Approval of an Existing Drug for Treatment of a New Condition 5
This exclusivity seeks to incentivize additional clinical investigations of
already-approved pharmaceutical products to test their potential benefits in the
treatment of additional medical conditions. Because this RCS is offered for the
testing of existing drug products in conjunction with newly developed
diagnostics, this RCS is, potentially, of particular importance in the context of
personalized medicine. 16
http://perma.cc/85QC-AHCP); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Patent and Exclusivity Search
Results from Query on Appl No 202570 Product 002 in the OBRx List, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfm?ApplNo=202570&Pro
ductNo=002&tableI=OB_Rx (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (archived at
http://perma.cc/ZRF6-FR74); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Patent and Exclusivity Search Results
from Query on Appl No 202429 Product 001 in the OB_Rx List, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfm?ApplNo=202429&Pro
ductNo=001&tablel=OB_Rx (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (archived at
http://perma.cc/5CVQ-LMLC); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Patent and Exclusivity Search
Results from Query on Appl No 202806 Product 001 in the OBRx List, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfm?Appl_No=202806&Pro
ductNo=001&tablel=OB_Rx (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (archived at
http://perma.cc/6WZL-9AH8).
14 See PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 54.
5 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)-(iv) (2012). During that three-year period, the FDA
is prevented from approving applications for generic versions of the drug product for that
new medical use.
16 While the FDA's view is that "[i]deally, a therapeutic product and its corresponding
[in vitro] companion diagnostic device should be developed contemporaneously," the FDA
also "recognizes there may be cases when contemporaneous development may not be
possible. An [in vitro] companion diagnostic device may be a novel [in vitro] device (i.e., a
new test for a new analyte), a new version of an existing device developed by a different
manufacturer, or an existing device that has already been approved or cleared for another
purpose." IN VITRO COMPANION DIAGNOSTICS GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 7.
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A notable limitation on the availability of this RCS as a means of
incentivizing such further testing of companion products is that this three-year
RCS is, apparently, only available to the holder of the reference listed drug
("RLD"), who is also, typically, the beneficiary of a market exclusivity in the
drug product itself. 17 Thus, third parties who may be interested in further
testing an already-approved drug product for a specific condition and/or in
conjunction with a newly developed diagnostic cannot expect to benefit from
this three-year RCS. This RCS is also unavailable for biological products, as
BPCIA does not include an RCS for such additional clinical testing.' 8
Still, at least in some cases, RCSs of this type have been granted by the FDA
to further the approval of certain drug products for the treatment of highly
specific conditions "as detected by an FDA-approved test."' 9 Hence, the three-
year market exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act is, in fact, available for
the development and testing of combination products consisting of diagnostic
and therapeutic components. The FDA has also indicated that in other cases
where, subsequently, a diagnostic is developed for use with a previously
approved product, "it may be necessary to update the therapeutic product's
labeling with appropriate test-related information if such information is
essential for the safe and effective use of the product." 20 It is thus possible, at
least hypothetically, that additional clinical testing by the RLD-holders leading
to such labeling changes would trigger (or re-trigger) the onset of a three-year
RCS under the Hatch-Waxman Act.21
It is quite possible that in some cases RLD-holders may be disincentivized
to conduct such additional clinical trials that may result in the restriction of the
potential user population of their drug products, even if such testing would
make them eligible for the additional three-year RCS. In other cases, however,
"7 See id. (specifying that the subsection applies to applications that contain "reports of
new clinical investigations ... essential to the approval of the application and conducted or
sponsored by the applicant [under subsection (b)]," (emphasis added) whereas the
"applicant" under subsection (b) is the holder of the RLD application).
'8 See 42 U.S.C § 262(k)(7)(C) (2012).
19 See, e.g., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Patent and Exclusivity Search Results from Query
on Appl No 202806 Product 001 in the OB_Rx List, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/patexclnew.cfm?ApplNo=202806&Pro
ductNo=00l&tableI=0B_Rx (last visited Mar. 31, 2015) (archived at
http://perma.cc/6WZL-9AH8) (listing an additional three-year exclusivity for Tafinlar
(Dabrafenib) as indicated for "Trametinib, in combination with Dabrafenib, for the
treatment of patients with unresectable or metastatic Melanoma with BRAF V600E or
V600K Mutations as detected by an FDA-approved test"); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
Exclusivity Codes (Definitions): Displaying Records 801 to 1000 of 1024, ORANGE BOOK,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/excltermsall.cfm?firstRec=801 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2015) (archived at http://perma.cc/3GRN-QMT4) (defining Exclusivity
Code I - 678).
20 See PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 36.
21 The author is not aware of such cases as of the time of writing this Article.
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it is quite possible to envision how RLD-holders may benefit from conducting
such additional clinical investigations of their existing pharmaceutical products
in conjunction with in vitro diagnostic devices, which would make them
eligible for the three-year RCS. 22
The three-year RCS under the Hatch-Waxman Act has been criticized,
however, as weak in light of the ease with which physicians prescribe FDA
approved products "off label," including for indications that are absent from
the labels of follow-on products (due to the existence of a patent or RCS
covering that particular use). Yet, solutions to this problem have been offered
and seem to be relatively easy to implement.23
Pediatric Exclusivity Under the FDA Modernization Act of 1997
("FDAMA") 24
Developers of original drug products may extend an existing RCS (under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, BPCIA, or Orphan Drug Act) by "tacking on" 25 to these
periods an additional term of six months of exclusivity for conducting clinical
studies of the drug in pediatric populations. 26 Importantly, like the three-year
RCS discussed earlier, this exclusivity is only available to the holder of the
reference listed drug (RLD) and is not available for later applicants who may
seek to receive an independent RCS on their follow-on product. While this
RCS does not appear to incentivize the development of personalized treatments
per se, it does promote further studies of existing drug products in pediatric
populations, thereby making the tested product, potentially, more
"individualized" or precise.
A Six-Year Data Exclusivity in Class III Medical DeviceS27 Under the FDA
22 This may occur, for example, where injuries resulting from the use of a specific drug
(and subsequent tort liability) may be so frequent that "personalizing" the drug would make
the drug product safer and, thus, more profitable for the RLD-holder. See, for example, the
case of abacavir. PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 39.
23 See Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses 36 (October 1, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2337821 (archived at
http://perma.cc/BG6Y-YGHS).
24 Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296
(codified as amended in scattered sections of21 U.S.C.).
25 See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)(1). The extension under FDAMA cannot stand alone when
there is no prior exclusivity (RCS or patent) on which it may be "tacked."
26 See id. To clarify, the exclusivity applies to the product in general and not just to its
use in a pediatric population; in fact, the exclusivity may apply even if the product is
eventually not approved for use in the pediatric population.
27 Under the FDAMA, a Class Ill medical device is a device which (i) "cannot be
classified as a class I" or "class II device because insufficient information exists to . . .
provide reasonable assurance of its safety . .. and (ii) .. . is purported or represented to be
for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial
292 [Vol. 21:2
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Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) 28
Class III is the most heavily regulated tier of medical devices under FDA
law, and devices classified as falling under this category require the approval
by the FDA of a premarket application ("PMA"), which is subject to extensive
data submission requirements. 29 Once approved, Class III medical devices
benefit from a period of six years of data exclusivity, during which the FDA
may not use data submitted in connection with the PMA for the approval of
follow-on versions of the approved device. 30 It appears, however, that most
diagnostics implicated in the area of personalized medicine are not classified
by the FDA as Class III medical devices and, as such, are not the subject of the
six-year data exclusivity under FDAMA. Notable examples of such devices are
electroencephalographs ("EEG"),3' imaging devices, 32 and certain genetic and
gene-expression assays. 33
Similarly, new and innovative uses of previously approved medical devices
appear to be ineligible for any existing RCS. For example, a new technique for
use of advanced imaging devices for the design and 3D printing of a
personalized tracheal stint 34 does not appear to be subject to any RCS
protection.35 It thus appears that most medical devices implicated in
personalized medicine do not stand to benefit from existing RCSs either in the
device itself or in new uses of previously approved devices in personalized
medicine.
ADDITIONAL WAYS OF USING RCSS TO INCENTIVIZE INNOVATION IN THE
AREA OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE
The FDA has recently taken action to consolidate its regulation of
importance in preventing impairment of human health, or ... presents a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
28 Food and Drug Modernization Act, Ill Stat. at 2296.
29 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1).
30 Food and Drug Modernization Act, § 216; 21 U.S.C. § 360j(h)(4)(A).
31 21 C.F.R. § 882.1400 (2015) (electroencephalograph).
32 E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 892.1000 (magnetic resonance diagnostic device); § 892.1600
(angiographic x-ray system); § 892.1610 (diagnostic x-ray beam-limiting device); §
892.1630 (electrostatic x-ray imaging system); § 892.1650 (image-intensified fluoroscopic
x-ray system); § 892.1720 (mobile x-ray system); § 892.1730 (photofluorographic x-ray
system); § 892.1750 (computed tomography x-ray system).
3 E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 864.7280 (factor V Leiden DNA mutation detection systems); §
866.5900 (cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator (CFTR) gene mutation
detection system); § 866.6040 (gene expression profiling test system for breast cancer
prognosis).
34 See PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 9.
3 Notably, this may well comport with patent policy in the area of medical methods of
treatment. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2012) (making remedies unavailable for patent
infringement in the context of "medical activity").
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diagnostics by, first, announcing a framework for regulatory oversight of
laboratory-developed tests (LDTs, a.k.a. "home brews"), 36 and, second,
releasing final guidance on in vitro companion diagnostic devices.37 The
increased regulatory burden that is likely to result from such newly established
regulation might, arguably, dampen what the FDA describes as an "explosion"
of products in the area of diagnostics in recent years. 8  Instituting an
additional RCS regime specifically for diagnostics may offset such an effect,
but would require passing of new legislation. Notably, such legislation is
already before Congress in the Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics
Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act of 2013 ("MODDERN Cures
Act of 2013").39
36 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ANTICIPATED DETAILS OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, AND CLINICAL LABORATORIES:
FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF LABORATORY DEVELOPED TESTS (LDTs):
DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, AND CLINICAL
LABORATORIES (2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDia
gnostics/UCM407409.pdf (archived at http://perma.cc/H88J-JXTS).
37 See IN VITRO COMPANION DIAGNOSTICS GUIDANCE, supra note 7.
3 PAVING THE WAY, supra note 2, at 23 ("Extraordinary advances across multiple
scientific fields are leading to an explosion in diagnostic tests, but questions concerning
appropriate evidentiary standards and regulatory oversight of these tests remain."); id. at 30
("[T]he sheer pace of the development of [in vitro diagnostics] over the past decade has
been staggering. Volumes of information arising out of the human genome project
combined with a dramatic decrease in costs of DNA sequencing, for example, are giving
way to an explosion of publications linking particular genetic markers to diseases or
conditions and a rapid application of this information in the development of new molecular
diagnostic tests."). It is unclear, however, how these trends comport (if at all) with what
appears to be a rather limited number of companion diagnostic devices approved by the
FDA to date. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIST OF CLEARED OR APPROVED COMPANION
DIAGNOSTIC DEVICES (IN VITRO AND IMAGING TOOLS),
www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/ucm3014
31.htm (archived at http://perma.cc/JCX3-RD44) (listing only twenty diagnostic products
approved by the FDA through January 2015). Notably, the number of companion diagnostic
devices approved by the FDA remained almost the same at least since August 2013. See
Alison M. Hill, Comment, Ambiguous Regulation and Questionable Patentability: A Toxic
Future for In Vitro Companion Diagnostic Devices and Personalized Medicine?, 2013 Wis.
L. REV. 1463, 1464-65 n.5, 1466 n.12 (2013) ("As of August 26, 2013, the FDA had
approved only nineteen in vitro companion diagnostic devices."). But see FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., Nucleic Acid Based Tests,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/uc
m330711.htm (archived at http://perma.cc/H5LM-263L) (listing another fifty-six human
genetic test products approved by the FDA through January 27, 2015, not necessarily as
companion diagnostics).
39 H.R. 3116, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013) (proposing an extension of the RCSs under the
ODA, Hatch-Waxman Act, and BPCIA by 6-12 months for the development of diagnostics
for use in conjunction with the therapeutic approved under these acts).
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Another option exists, however, that does not require the passage of new
legislation, but only a change in FDA policy. The FDA could start requiring
that prescribing information (a.k.a. labels) of pharmaceuticals having in vitro
combination diagnostic devices mention specific devices approved by the FDA
for use with such pharmaceuticals rather than the type of test, as the FDA
currently requires. 40 By doing so, the FDA would effectively "bind" such
specific diagnostic device products to pharmaceutical products that are,
potentially, covered by RCSs or whose indicated uses are covered by RCSs (in
the case of drugs approved under the Hatch-Waxman Act and subject to the
three-year RCS for additional clinical testing). This, of course, would not
preclude some prescribers from prescribing any other comparable in vitro
diagnostics for "off label" use in combination with such pharmaceuticals. Still
it would effectively make the companion diagnostic mentioned by name in the
prescribing information the default diagnostic for use in conjunction with the
prescribed pharmaceutical unless a prescriber explicitly prescribes a different
diagnostic product. While the economic value of such a benefit would greatly
depend on the circumstances of the specific diagnostics' market prescribed in
conjunction with a given product, it would presumably be higher than zero
(which is what it is now) and, potentially, significant. This, in turn, may create
added incentives to develop and be the first to have approved in vitro
diagnostic products for use in conjunction with specific pharmaceutical
products.
Importantly, however, it appears that the FDA does not believe that this
course of action is desirable, as it explicitly requires that "[t]he therapeutic
product labeling should specify use of an FDA approved or cleared [in vitro]
companion diagnostic device, rather than a particular manufacturer's [in vitro]
companion diagnostic device." 41 The reasoning provided for this policy by the
FDA is that "[t]his will facilitate the development and use of more than one
approved or cleared [in vitro] companion diagnostic device of the type
described in the labeling for the therapeutic product." 42 It appears that the
FDA is well aware of the possibility of requiring the use of a specific in vitro
companion diagnostic in a therapeutic's label as a means of providing
competitive benefits in the diagnostic product, but does not believe that such
benefits are necessary for incentivizing further development of in vitro
companion diagnostics.
The FDA's position begs the question whether and to what extent is there a
need for additional incentives for innovation in the area of diagnostics, given
what the FDA brands as the explosion in data and products in this area over the
40 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(iii) (2015); IN VITRO COMPANION DIAGNOSTICS
GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 11 ("If a diagnostic test is essential for monitoring either
therapeutic or toxic effects, the type of test must be identified under Warnings and
Precautions.").
41 IN VITRO COMPANION DIAGNOSTICS GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 11.
42 Id.
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last decade. 43 It appears that at least some do not share the FDA's optimism
regarding the sufficiency of current incentives for innovation in the area of
diagnostics.44
To mitigate possible risks of over-protection of personalized medicine
technology, it is also advisable to provide newly approved diagnostic products
with data exclusivity rather than market exclusivity. The advantage of data
exclusivity is that it works its effect by conferring a competitive advantage on
its beneficiary only if and when the data protected under the exclusivity is
actually valuable. In other words, where the independent development of a
similar dataset for a competing product would not be prohibitively expensive
given the realities of the market in the diagnostic, the data exclusivity in the
original product will not deter potential competitors seeking to have their own
competing diagnostic product approved by the FDA.
Another option is to adopt an RCS regime in medical diagnostics similar to
the one established under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA). 45 Under the FIFRA RCS regime, the developer of a new product
benefits from a ten-year data exclusivity period, which is then followed by
another period of five years during which the data is available to third parties,
but "only if the [third party] applicant [for the follow-on product] has made an
offer to compensate the original data submitter." 46
CONCLUSION
While existing RCS regimes cover some personalized medicine
technologies, there seems to be very little protection afforded under these
regimes to diagnostic technologies. Additional RCS protection for diagnostics
may be provided via legislation such as the MODDERN Cures Act.
Alternatively-and more feasibly-the FDA may provide further incentives
for the development of diagnostics by requiring the mentioning of specific
diagnostic products in labels of therapeutics with which such diagnostics are
combined. Regardless, unless and until it is clear that the area of diagnostics
suffers from a lack of sufficient incentives for innovation, it is preferable that
any new competitive benefit proffered to diagnostic products would not consist
of market exclusivity.
43 See H.R. 3116 § 103.
4 See Editorial, Myriad Diagnostic Concerns, 31 NATURE BIOTECH. 571 (2013) (arguing
that the combination of the Myriad and Prometheus decisions, the FDA's anticipated
increased oversight of laboratory tests and diagnostics, and concerns regarding
reimbursement by insurance companies are "the death knell for diagnostic innovation," as
evidenced by decreased private investment in the diagnostics sector).
45 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163
(1947) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2012)).
46 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii) (2012). For further discussion of the FIFRA RCS regime,
see Heled, supra note 3, Part II.A.
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